In this paper, we claim that, if you justifiably believe that you ought to perform some act, it follows that you ought to perform that act. In the first half, we argue for this claim by reflection on what makes for correct reasoning from beliefs about what you ought to do. In the second half, we consider a number of objections to this argument and its conclusion. In doing so, we arrive at another argument for the view that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true, based in part on the idea that that the epistemic and practical domains are uniform, in a sense we spell out. We conclude by sketching possible implications of our discussion for the debates over what is wrong with akrasia and pragmatic encroachment on justified belief and knowledge.
Introduction
In this paper, we argue that justified beliefs about what you ought to do must be true. That is, we argue that the following principle holds necessarily:
'ought' and 'may' are duals: you may φ if and only if it is not the case that you ought not to φ.
Just as there are different senses of 'ought', there are different senses of 'justification'. And, just as there is a deliberative sense of 'ought', there is a deliberative sense of 'justification'. The assumptions above guarantee this. If you ought not to φ in the deliberative sense, then in the same sense you are not justified in φing. Another way to introduce the relevant notion of justification is to note that, just as the question 'What ought I to do?' can govern or guide deliberation, the question 'What am I justified in doing?' can govern or guide deliberation. Plausibly, the answer to the second question will accord with the answer to the second. The notion of justification we are interested in is the one expressed in such contexts.
In view of this, it is unsurprising that, just as there is a debate between objectivists and perspectivists concerning what determines what you ought to do, there is a corresponding
debate about what determines what you are justified in doing: for some justification depends on the facts, for others it depends on one's epistemic position. 5 We take it that these remarks pick out a single interpretation of Ought Infallibilism.
We do not deny that 'ought' and 'justifiably' can also express other notions, so that alternative readings of Ought Infallibilism are possible. We will not consider such readings
here. When interpreted in the way we intend, Ought Infallibilism is a significant thesis, insofar as the deliberative senses of 'ought' and 'justification' are central to ethics and epistemology: 'what ought I to do?' is widely taken to be the central question of ethics; many epistemologists have taken as their central concern a notion of justification which is deontic doubts that justification is a deontic notion but suggests that, if it is, it is a permissive notion. For reasons not to share Alston's doubts, see Chuard and Southwood 2009; McHugh 2012. 5 For objectivism about justification, see, e.g. Littlejohn 2012. One might think that on such a view Ought Infallibilism is trivial, since objectivism implies that justification is in general factive. However, that is not the case, as we explain below.
and plays an important role in guiding us in belief-formation and other epistemic practices.
We consider the importance of our thesis in more detail below.
One final clarification. The variable in Ought Infallibilism should be understood as ranging over actions (only). Whether Ought Infallibilism could be extended to cover attitudes like beliefs and intentions is not an issue we address in what follows.
The Argument from Enkratic Reasoning
We now turn to the principal argument for Ought Infallibilism, which turns on the role of normative beliefs in deliberation. To see the basic idea, suppose that you are deliberating as to whether to go the cinema this evening and you come to justifiably believe that you ought to do so. How should your deliberation proceed? On the face of it, you should go ahead and decide to go the cinema. But if you should decide to go to the cinema, you should also go when the time comes.
Our argument spells out and develops this idea in detail. We proceed in two stages.
Stage 1
Consider:
(1) You justifiably believe that you ought to φ.
(2) It is correct reasoning to move from the belief that you ought to φ to deciding to φ.
If you reason correctly from justified premise-attitudes, you will reach a justified conclusion-attitude.
(4) So, there is justification for you to decide to φ.
(5) So, there is justification for you to φ.
(6) So, you may φ.
7 unjustified starting points cannot be expected to lead to justified attitudes. But if we begin from justified attitudes, we should expect correct reasoning to lead us to further justified attitudes.
That said, it might be thought that (3) fails to take account of the defeasibility of correct reasoning. For example, it might be claimed that it is correct reasoning to move from believing that you promised to φ to intending to φ. However, this piece of reasoning does not guarantee that, if you start from a justified premise-attitude, you will reach a justified conclusion attitude. For instance, you might also have a justified belief that by failing to φ you could do something more important. In that case, you would not be justified in intending to keep your promise.
Enkratic reasoning is, however, indefeasible. That is, given the justified belief that you ought to φ, there are no justified attitudes which could be added to your psychology which would make you unjustified in making the transition to deciding to φ (without also making you unjustified in believing that you ought to φ). To see this consider the following putative cases in which enkratic reasoning is defeated:
Case 1: As well as justifiably believing that you ought to go the cinema, you justifiably intend to get medicine for a friend. Given this intention, and assuming you cannot both go to the cinema and get medicine, you are not justified in making the transition from your belief to deciding to go to the cinema.
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One might think there are exceptions to this rule, namely, cases involving so-called reasons of the wrong kind (WKRs). 9 Suppose that an eccentric billionaire offers you a reward for deciding to go to the cinema and on this basis alone you decide to go. In this case, one might think, you are justified in deciding to go the cinema but not in going.
However, the kind of case we are considering does not involve WKRs. The basis for the decision to φ is a justified belief that you ought to φ. A WKR for making a decision could not justify such a belief. If the billionaire's offer justifies deciding to go the cinema, it does not justify you in believing that you ought to go; after all, we can make the case one in which, if you go, you will not get the reward.
Setting aside WKRs, the move from (4) to (5) looks fine.
The move from (5) to (6) follows from our earlier assumption that justification has deontic implications.
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So, from (1), the assumption that you justifiably believe that you ought to φ, plus additional premises which we have defended, we arrive at (6), you may φ. This establishes Almost Infallibilism.
Stage 2
Can we make the step from Almost Infallibilism to Ought Infallibilism? There are two lines of thought that support doing so.
First, as mentioned above, to say that you may φ is to say that it is not the case that you ought not to φ. it being the case that you ought to φ which (i) did not prevent you being justified in believing that you ought to φ and (ii) could not make it the case that you ought not to φ. We consider below ( §5) if there are such considerations of which (i) is true. But it would be very odd if there were such considerations and (ii) was also true of them. If there are considerations which are compatible with justifiably believing that you ought to φ that can make it permissible not to φ, why can't there also be considerations of this sort which can make it impermissible to φ? Indeed, it seems it should be possible to turn considerations of the former sort into considerations of the latter sort, just by increasing their weight.
To make the point more concrete, consider:
You justifiably believe that you ought to go the cinema this evening on the grounds that a new Coen brothers film is showing. Unbeknownst to you, the pilot for the new Coen brothers TV series is also showing this evening. Given this consideration, it is not the case that you ought to go the cinema -you may go to the cinema but you may instead watch TV. So, your justified belief is false.
If this is possible, the following is surely possible too:
Unbeknownst to you, the pilot will show once and once only (whereas the film will be available on DVD in due course). Given this fact, you ought to watch TV and ought not to go the cinema. So, your justified belief is false.
In view of this, we think that, if Almost Infallibilism is true, Ought Infallibilism must also be true.
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Here is a second line of thought which takes us from (4) -there is justification for you to decide to φ -to Ought Infallibilism:
If you justifiably believe that you ought to φ, you can have no other justified attitudes from which you could correctly reason to deciding not to φ.
(8)
If you can have no other justified attitudes from which you could correctly reason to deciding not to φ, you lack justification for deciding not to φ.
(9) So, you lack justification for deciding not to φ.
(10) If there is justification for you to decide to φ and no justification for deciding not to φ, you ought to decide to φ.
(11) So, you ought to decide to φ.
(12) So, you ought to φ.
Cases 1 and 2 above suggest that (7) is true. In Case 1, it seems that you could not be justified in both believing that you ought to go to the cinema and in deciding not to go the cinema but to get medicine instead (if you justifiably believe that you can't do both). In Case 2, you would not be reasoning correctly if you moved from the justified belief that going to the cinema will lead you to miss an important deadline to deciding not to go, given your justified belief that you ought to go to the cinema.
(8) is highly plausible. To see this, consider the contrapositive: if you are justified in deciding not to φ, you can have some justified attitudes from which you could correctly reasoning to making that decision. To deny this is to allow for baseless justified decisions.
(9) follows from (4), (7) and (8).
Is (10) true? Even if you cannot make a justified decision without deciding to φ, one might think, it does not follow that you ought to decide to φ. Perhaps you may simply make no decision at all as to whether to φ.
However, if you are justified in making no decision regarding φing, it is hard to see how you could also be justified in believing that you ought to φ. Whatever considerations justify you in thinking that you ought to go the cinema -for example, that you promised to meet your friend there -would presumably defeat any considerations which might otherwise justify making no decision as to whether to do so -for example, that it does not matter whether you go to the cinema. Since we are concerned only with cases in which you justifiably believe that you ought to φ, we can set aside the above doubts about (10).
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(11) follows from (4), (9), and (10).
Once again setting aside cases involving WKRs (cf. §3.1), (12) follows from (11).
So, from (1), the assumption that you justifiably believe that you ought to φ, plus additional premises which we have defended, we arrive at (12), you ought to φ. This establishes Ought Infallibilism.
Interval
Ought Infallibilism might seem incredible (in a bad way). Consider:
13 It might be replied that, even if you justifiably believe that you ought to φ, you might nonetheless be justified in not making a decision now on the grounds that one can be made later. But (10) does not assume that the time at which the decision must be made is the time at which you are justified in deciding (only) to φ. If we were to add temporal indices to (10), we would reformulate it as follows: (10*) If there is justification at t1 for you to decide to (φ at t2) and no justification at t1 for deciding not to (φ at t2), you ought at t1 to decide, by t2, to (φ by t2). 14 It is important to note that this assumption is not needed for our argument for Ought
Infallibilism. Its role is just to make it easier to formulate and discuss certain objections to it; that is to say, it is for the benefit of our opponent.
The Hybrid View
As mentioned above ( §2), there is a disagreement about how to understand the deliberative Perhaps your perspective is determined by the known facts, the knowable facts, how the facts appear to you to be, the evidence you have, and so on. The differences between these views do not matter for present purposes. In one sense, to have a reason to φ is just for there to be a reason for you to φ. In another sense, to have a reason to φ is to be in a position to φ for that reason, which, one might think, requires standing in a certain epistemic relation to it. For present purposes, we remain neutral on how talk of having is to be understood, since to take a stand on this issue is to take a stand on the debate between objectivists and perspectivists which we discuss below. 15 For discussions of objectivism and perspectivism (although not always in these terms), see Broome 2013; Feldman 1988b; Gibbons 2010 Gibbons , 2013 Graham 2010; Jackson 1991; Kiesewetter 2011 Kiesewetter , 2013 Littlejohn 2009 Littlejohn , 2011 Littlejohn , 2012 Lord 2015; Mason 2013; Ross 2012; Smith 2011; Smith 2006; Thomson 2008; Zimmerman 2014. The debate between objectivists and perspectivists arises in both the practical and epistemic domains. If this line of thought is persuasive, it is as persuasive in the epistemic domain (cf. Steup 1999) . Since all the evidence suggests that the pill will relieve the headache, Doctor is not blameworthy or criticisable for believing this. So, whether a person ought to believe something, or is justified in doing so, is not determined by the facts but by her perspective on the facts.
Perhaps the most influential argument for perspectivism about the practical ought appeals to cases like the following: 20 Doctor is deciding whether to give drug A, drug B, or drug C to treat Patient's painful but nonfatal disease. Doctor knows that B will partially cure Patient and that one of A and C will completely cure Patient and the other will kill her. However, she is not in a position to know which of A and C will kill Patient and which will completely cure her. In fact, A is the complete cure.
According to objectivism, Doctor ought to give A. But that seems wrong. If Doctor gives A there's a 50/50 chance that Patient will die, whereas Patient will certainly be partially cured if she gives B. According to perspectivism, the doctor should give B, which seems right.
Parallel lines of thought have been offered in support of perspectivism about the epistemic ought. Suppose that a fair coin has been tossed but you have not seen how it landed. If the coin landed heads, objectivism implies that you may believe it landed heads.
But this seems wrong -from your perspective, there's a 50/50 chance that it landed tails instead. Given the information available, it seems that you should suspend judgment. This is the verdict perspectivism delivers (cf. Feldman 1988a: 245).
For Objectivism
An influential line of thought in support of objectivism, and against perspectivism, about the practical ought begins with reflection on contexts of advice (see Graham 2010; Thomson 2008: 187-191) . When advising a person as to whether she ought to φ, the advisor takes into account (what she takes to be) the facts, not the advisee's epistemic situation. Suppose that an advisee asks, 'Should I go to the cinema?' The advisee has no knowledge or views which would support going over not going. In contrast, the advisor knows that a new Coen brothers film is showing. In light of this information, the advisor says, 'You should go to the cinema'.
Given perspectivism, this advice is false, at least prior to being given. Worse still, the advice changes the advisee's epistemic position. In that case, it is hard to see how it could count as informing the advisee of what she ought to do, rather than altering this. These are not problems for objectivism.
We find the same when we turn to advice about what to believe. Suppose that an advisee asks, 'Should I believe that Smith killed Jones?' The advisee has no knowledge or views which would support believing or disbelieving this. In contrast, the advisor knows that
Smith's fingerprints were on the gun. In light of this information, the advisor says, 'You should believe that Smith killed Jones'. Given perspectivism, this advice is false, at least prior to being given. Worse still, the advice changes the advisee's epistemic position. In that case, it is hard to see how it could count as informing the advisee of what she ought to think, rather than altering this. These are not problems for objectivism.
A related line of thought for objectivism and against perspectivism in the practical domain appeals to judgments of hindsight (cf. Ross 2002 Ross [1930 : 32). To return to an earlier example, on learning that, contrary to the evidence, the pill caused Patient terrible suffering, Doctor might say to herself, 'I shouldn't have given Patient the pill!' or, 'I was wrong to give the pill!' If perspectivism is true, these thoughts would be mistaken. Objectivism, in contrast, vindicates them.
If this line of thought succeeds, it applies in the case of belief too. On learning that the pill causes terrible suffering, Doctor might think to herself, 'I should never have believed that it would cure her!' or 'I was wrong to think the pill would cure her!' If perspectivism is true, these thoughts would be mistaken. Objectivism, in contrast, vindicates them.
The phenomenology of first-person deliberation seems to point to objectivism. When deliberating as to whether to believe that Smith killed Jones, the focus is not on one's epistemic situation but on, say, whether Smith had a motive -that is, on the facts. If the aim of theoretical deliberation is to answer the question, 'What should I believe?', the most natural explanation for this is that the answer to that question is determined by the facts (cf.
Shah 2003).
Likewise, when deliberating as to whether to go the cinema, the focus is not on one's epistemic situation but on, say, whether the Coen brothers film is showing -that is, on the facts. If the aim of practical deliberation is to answer the question, 'What should I do?', the most natural explanation for this is that the answer to that question is determined by the facts (cf. Shah 2008).
Interim Conclusion
As this survey suggests, if an argument supports objectivism in the practical domain, it supports objectivism in the epistemic domain, and vice versa. Likewise, if an argument supports perspectivism in the practical domain, it supports perspectivism in the epistemic domain, and vice versa. So, the hybrid view is unmotivated. 21 We should either be
objectivists about both what we ought to do and what we ought to believe or be perspectivists about both. Call this the uniformity view.
Note that the above suggests, not just that the practical and epistemic oughts are both epistemically constrained or both epistemically unconstrained, but that, if the relevant oughts are epistemically constrained, the constraints are the same in each case.
It is important to stress that we are not endorsing the arguments for objectivism or perspectivism. The claim is rather that objectivism or perspectivism in the epistemic domain stands or falls with its counterpart in the practical domain. This paper is neutral as to which stands and which falls. 21 One might try to motivate the hybrid view by appeal to the aims of action and belief -action aims only at the good, whereas belief aims at the truth. As Littlejohn (2012: 209) shows, this does not support the hybrid view.
With the hybrid view rejected, Ought Infallibilism should seem considerably more plausible. Indeed, some might think that the uniformity view implies Ought Infallibilism.
However, this is a mistake. Even granting the uniformity view, Ought Infallibilism will be false if (A) there are reasons for believing you ought to φ which are not reasons to φ or (B) reasons not to φ which are not reasons not to believe that you ought to φ. Reasons of either sort might allow you to justifiably believe that you ought to φ when it is not the case that you ought to φ.
In the following sections, we consider whether there are any cases of type (A). (What we say carries over to putative cases of type (B).) We will suggest that whether or not there are such reasons, Ought Infallibilism holds. Together with our rejection of the hybrid view, this will amount to a further argument for Ought Infallibilism.
WKRs
One kind of putative counter-example to Ought Infallibilism involves WKRs. Consider:
An eccentric billionaire offers you a reward to believe that you ought to go the cinema, which will be withdrawn if you go. The offer is not a reason to go. In this case, you have most reason to believe that you ought to go to the cinema, hence, you are justified in so believing, but it is not the case that you ought to go.
In passing, note that cases like this challenge Ought Infallibilism, even when justification is understood in objectivist terms.
The most straightforward response to such cases is to deny that there are WKRs, more specifically, that there are pragmatic reasons for believing. 22 It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this response so we will offer some alternatives. 
Deontic Testimony
Testimonial cases seem to provide further counterexamples to Ought Infallibilism. Consider:
A reliable friend tells you that you ought to go to the cinema. This testimony provides a reason for believing that you ought to go to the cinema -other things being equal, you might justifiably believe that you ought to go on the basis of this testimony. But that your friend has told you that you ought to go the cinema is not a reason for going.
So, it cannot make it the case that you ought to go. So, Ought Infallibilism is false.
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This objection gets much of its force from the hybrid view. Suppose that, in the example above, you act on your friend's advice and go to the cinema. It turns out that you hate the film. This might seem like a case in which you justifiably but mistakenly thought that you ought to go to the cinema. But this reaction presupposes that the fact that you would hate the film -a fact that was outside your perspective -was a reason not to see the film, but not a reason not to believe that you ought to see it. This requires the hybrid view.
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Nonetheless, the objection does not get all of its force from the hybrid view. There is also the worry that the fact that your friend said that you ought to  is not a reason to  because it is not a 'right-maker' -it is not the kind of thing that could explain why you ought to .
Kearns and Star argue that testimony is a right-maker (2009). So one option is to
accept their defence of the claim that the fact that your friend told you to do something is a reason to do it.
However, there are other options. Ought Infallibilism could be true even if testimony that you ought to  is not a reason to . Ought Infallibilism requires only that whenever deontic testimony puts you in a position to justifiably believe that you ought to , there are reasons to  strong enough to ensure that you ought to . It does not require that the testimony is itself such a reason.
In many cases, deontic testimony will either be accompanied by or implicate further claims. For instance, if testimony that you ought to eat cabbage puts you in a position to justifiably believe that you ought to eat cabbage, you will typically also be put in a positiongiven ordinary background knowledge -to justifiably believe that cabbage is, or is likely to 25 Titelbaum (2015: 265) So it is plausible that in cases in which deontic testimony justifies you in believing that you ought to , you also ought to . Testimonial cases are not compelling counterexamples to Ought Infallibilism.
Another Route to Ought Infallibilism?
The defence of the uniformity view, together with the discussion in the preceding sections, delivers an answer to the question, broached above, of why justified normative beliefs must be true. In doing so, it also provides the further argument for Ought Infallibilism, promised above.
With For the perspectivist, this is not always the case. The considerations which justify you in believing that it is raining need not determine that it is raining. In contrast, the objectivist is committed to the view that, WKRs aside, justified beliefs are always true, whether or not they concern normative matters.
As for WKRs, we doubt that there are any but, if we are wrong about that, any case in which you justifiably believe that you ought to φ will not involve WKRs. So, WKRs do not undermine Ought Infallibilism.
As for cases involving deontic testimony, either such testimony makes it right to φ and to believe that you ought to φ, or in any case in which testimony makes it right to believe that you ought to φ there will be considerations which make it right to φ. Either way, Ought
Infallibilism stands.
So, at this point we have not only addressed an objection to Ought Infallibilism but provided another route to it via the rejection of the hybrid view.
Ought Implies Can
If certain normative claims imply non-normative claims, this might seem to pose a problem for Ought Infallibilism. Consider, for example, the principle that ought implies can (OIC). 27 It might seem obvious that you can be justified in believing that you ought to φ even though you cannot. Suppose that you know that there is a Coen brothers film showing this evening.
On the basis of this, you justifiably believe that you ought to go the cinema. However, though you are in no position to know this, your house has been sealed and you cannot leave. Since you cannot go to the cinema, and given OIC, your justified belief that you ought to do so is false. So, given OIC, Ought Infallibilism is false.
It is important to stress that this is only a problem for the perspectivist. The objectivist will claim that, given OIC, you cannot be justified in believing that you ought to φ when you cannot φ.
For the purposes of this paper, we do not take a stand in the debate between perspectivists and objectivists. On behalf of perspectivism, we will instead make a case for thinking that the perspectivist should reject OIC. 28 If it fails to persuade, a fallback option is to qualify Ought Infallibilism so that it applies only to justified beliefs about actions that you can perform (cf. Gibbons 2013: 188, Kiesewetter 2013: §7.8).
The first point to consider is that OIC does not sit happily with some motivations for perspectivism. Consider: Needless to say, these are large issues and it is beyond the scope of this paper to resolve them. But we hope to have made something of a case for thinking that, while the objectivist should deny that OIC undermines Ought Infallibilism, the perspectivist should deny OIC. Either way, there is no objection to Ought Infallibilism from OIC.
No Justified Consequentialists?
You might think that it is simply implausible to deny that one can have justified false beliefs about some subject matter. When the subject matter is normative, you might think it especially implausible. Suppose that consequentialism is false. Is no-one justified in believing consequentialism? Surely not.
Objectivists and perspectivists will say different things in response to this concern.
We will outline their responses in turn.
No Objectively Justified Consequentialists?
Objectivists will argue that, while consequentialists do not justifiably believe that they ought to maximize value, they may be rational or, alternatively, blameless in so believing (cf. Given objectivism, there will be cases in which you ought to φ even though you could not reasonably be expected to realise this, or even though the considerations which determine that you ought to φ are beyond your ken. In such cases, a failure to φ will be rational or blameless (cf. Graham 2010).
In making this response on behalf of the objectivist, one might think that we are reintroducing the hybrid view. Second, the mark of the hybrid view is that it treats normative statuses such as justification differently as they apply to belief and action -for instance, it takes justified belief, but not justified action, to depend on one's perspective. The response we are suggesting does not accept this. Instead, it distinguishes a normative status which depends on one's perspective -rationality -from a normative status which does not -justification.
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Third, even if the objectivist concedes that 'justification' can be used to express the notion of rationality, and thus to express a notion which depends on one's perspective, she does not thereby concede the hybrid view unless she also holds that it is this notion of justification which connects to the deliberative 'ought', that is, that it follows from there being this kind of justification to φ that it is not the case that you ought not φ, in the sense of 'ought' which structures deliberation. Our objectivist does not concede this further claim.
No Perspectivally Justified Consequentialists?
In response to the above concern, perspectivists can go one of two ways. 31 According to some perspectivists, what you ought to do is determined by your perspective with respect to the non-normative facts, together with the true normative principles. This kind of perspectivist is in the same boat as the objectivist -she will have to say that consequentialists, for example, may be rational or blameless without being justified. Following Williamson (2000) , many would deny that luminosity holds.
Is Ought Infallibilism Trivial?
In the previous section, and throughout, we allowed that there are different senses of 'ought'
and 'justification'. In doing so, we allowed that are different readings of Ought Infallibilism, depending on how these terms are to be understood. One might object that, once the intended reading is made clear, specifically, once it is stipulated that the relevant terms are being used in their deliberative senses in each of their occurrences, the thesis is trivially true, hence, Finally, Ought Infallibilism has nontrivial consequences, some of which we outline in closing.
Closing remarks
We argued for Ought Infallibilism by considering the role of normative beliefs in reasoning.
Having done so, we addressed objections to Ought Infallibilism and thereby provided another route to it.
Ought Infallibilism is an independently interesting thesis. It also raises further questions, which we will have to leave for another occasion. 
